A principal wishes to transact business with a multidimensional distribution of agents whose preferences are known only in the aggregate. Assuming a twist (= generalized Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing) hypothesis, quasi-linear utilities, and that agents can choose only pure strategies, we identify a structural condition on the value b(x, y) of product type y to agent type x -and on the principal's costs c(y) -which is necessary and sufficient for reducing the profit maximization problem faced by the principal to a convex program. This is a key step toward making the principal's problem theoretically and computationally tractable; in particular, it allows us to derive uniqueness and stability of the principal's optimal strategyand similarly of the strategy maximizing the expected welfare of the agents when the principal's profitability is constrained. We call this condition non-negative cross-curvature: it is also (i) necessary and sufficient to guarantee convexity of the set of b-convex functions, (ii) invariant under reparametrization of agent and/or ✩ The initial impetus for this study emerged from discussions with Ivar Ekeland. RJM is pleased to express his gratitude to Ekeland for introducing him to the principal-agent problem in 1996, and for anticipating already at that time that it ought to be tackled using techniques from the mathematical theory of optimal transportation. We are grateful to Giuseppe Buttazzo and Guillaume Carlier also, for stimulating discussions, and to Shibing Chen for a careful reading of the manuscript. The authors are pleased to thank the Institute for Pure and Applied Mathematics at UCLA and the Institut Fourier at Grenoble for their generous hospitality during various stages of this work. RJM's research was supported in part by NSERC grant 217006-08 and NSF grant DMS-0354729. YHK was partially supported by NSF grant DMS-0635607 through the membership at Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton NJ and NSERC discovery grant 371642-09. Author's personal copy A. Figalli et al. / Journal of Economic Theory 146 (2011) 454-478 455 product types by diffeomorphisms, and (iii) a strengthening of Ma, Trudinger and Wang's necessary and sufficient condition (A3w) for continuity of the correspondence between an exogenously prescribed distribution of agents and of products. We derive the persistence of economic effects such as the desirability for a monopoly to establish prices so high they effectively exclude a positive fraction of its potential customers, in nearly the full range of non-negatively cross-curved models.
Introduction
The principal-agent paradigm provides a microeconomic framework for modeling noncompetitive decision problems which must be made in the face of informational asymmetry. Such problems range from monopolist nonlinear pricing [26, 36, 39, 2] and product line design ("customer screening") [31] , to optimal taxation [24] , labour market signalling and contract theory [35, 27] , regulation of monopolies [4] including public utilities [28] , and mechanism design [22, 25] . A typical example would be the problem faced by a monopolist who wants to market automobiles y ∈ Y to a population of potential buyers ("agents") x ∈ X. Knowing the value b(x, y) of car y to buyer x, the relative frequency dμ(x) of different buyer types in the population, and the cost c(y) she incurs in manufacturing car type y, the principal needs to decide which products (or product bundles) to manufacture and how much to charge for each of them, so as to maximize her profits.
In the simplest models there are only a finite number of product possibilities (e.g. with air conditioning, or without) and a finite number of buyer types (e.g. rich, middle-class, and poor); or possibly a one-dimensional continuum of product possibilities (parameterized, say, by quality) and of agent types (parameterized, say, by income) [24, 35, 26, 4] . Of course, real cars depend on more than one parameter -fuel efficiency, comfort, options, reliability, styling, handling and safety, to name a few -as do car shoppers, who vary in wealth, income, age, commuting needs, family size, personal disposition, etc. Thus realistic modeling requires multidimensional type spaces X ⊂ R m and Y ⊂ R n , as in [27, 22, 32, 5, 10] . Although such models can often be reduced to optimization problems in the calculus of variations [8, 5] , in the absence of convexity they remain dauntingly difficult to analyze. Convexity -whether manifest or hidden -rules out critical points other than global minima, and is often the key to locating and characterizing optimal strategies either numerically or theoretically. The purpose of the present article is to determine when convexity is present, assuming the dimensions m = n of the agent and product type spaces coincide.
An archetypal model was addressed by Wilson [39] , Armstrong [2] , and Rochet and Choné [31] . A particular example from the last of these studies makes the simplifying hypotheses X = Y = [0, ∞[ n , c(y) = |y| 2 /2, and b(x, y) = x, y . By assuming this bilinearity of the buyers' valuations, Rochet and Choné were able to show that the principal's problem can be reduced to a quadratic minimization over the set of non-negative convex functions -itself a convex set. Although the convexity constraint makes this variational problem non-standard, for buyers distributed uniformly throughout the unit square in R 2 , they exploited a combination of theoretical and computational analysis to show a number of results of economic interest. Their most striking conclusion was that the profit motive alone leads the principal to discriminate between three different types of buyers: (i) low-end customers whom she will not market cars to, becauseas Armstrong had already discovered -making cars affordable to this segment of the market would cost her too much of her mid-range and high-end profits; (ii) mid-range customers, whom she will encourage to choose from a one-parameter family of affordably-priced compromise vehicles; (iii) high-end customers, whom she will use both available dimensions of her product space to market expensive vehicles individually tailored to suit each customer's desires. Whether or not such bunching phenomena are robust is an unanswered question of considerable interest which -due to their specificity to particular valuation functions -the techniques of the foregoing authors remain unable to address. The possibility of non-robustness was highlighted in [5] ; below we go further to suggest which specific perturbations of the valuation function b(x, y) are most likely to yield robust results. On the other hand, our conclusions confirm Armstrong' s assertion that what he called the desirability of exclusion is a very general phenomenon in the models we study (Theorem 4.8) . This exclusion however, is less generic when the dimensions of the type and allocation spaces differ [10] , or when their strict convexity fails [32] : see Deneckere and Severinov for a discussion of the case (m, n) = (2, 1); see also [3] . 1 For general valuations b(x, y), the principal's problem can be reformulated as a minimization problem over the space of b-convex functions (Definition 3.1), according to Carlier [8] . Such functions generally form a compact but non-convex set, which prevented Carlier from deducing much more than the existence of an optimal strategy for the principal -a result which can also be obtained using the method of Monteiro and Page [25] (for related developments see Basov [5] or Rochet and Stole [32] ). Our present purpose is to identify conditions on the agent valuations which guarantee convexity of this feasible set (Theorem 3.2). In the setting we choose, the conditions we find will actually be necessary as well as sufficient for convexity; this necessity imparts a significance to these conditions even if they appear unexpected or unfamiliar. If, in addition, the principal's manufacturing cost c(y) is b * -convex, for b * (y, x) := b(x, y), the principal's problem becomes a convex program which renders it much more amenable to standard theoretical and computational techniques [11] . Although the resulting problem retains the complexities of the Wilson, Armstrong, and Rochet and Choné's models, we are able to deduce new results which remained inaccessible until now, such as conditions guaranteeing uniqueness (Theorem 4.6) and stability (Corollary 4.7) of the principal's optimal strategy. The same considerations and results apply also to the problem of maximizing the total welfare of the agents under the constraint that it remain possible for the principal to operate without sustaining a loss (Remark 5.1).
Hypotheses: the basic framework
As in Ma, Trudinger and Wang's work concerning the smoothness of optimal mappings [21] , let us assume the buyer valuations satisfy the following hypotheses. Let X denote the closure of any given set X ⊂ R n , and for each (x 0 , y 0 ) ∈ X × Y assume: 1 A different robustness result concerning exclusion was found by Barelli, Basov, Bugarin and King [3] , who relax the convexity assumption on the space of agents while allowing a fairly wide class of valuations b (x, y) . No hypothesis analogous to our (B3) below appears in their work, though they relax our convexity hypothesis (B2) considerably and work under a different hypothesis than (B1). We are grateful to an anonymous referee, for bringing this work to our attention after the present manuscript had been submitted. 
are diffeomorphisms onto their ranges;
Here the subscript x 0 serves as a reminder that Y x 0 denotes a subset of the cotangent space T * x 0 X= R n to X at x 0 . Note (B1) is strengthened form of the multidimensional generalization of the Spence-Mirrlees single-crossing condition expressed in separate works from the 1990s by Rüschendorf, Gangbo, and Levin; see e.g. [1] . It turns out to imply that the marginal utility of buyer type x 0 determines the product he selects uniquely and smoothly (cf. (4.2)), and similarly that buyer type who selects product y 0 will be a well-defined smooth function of y 0 and the marginal cost of that product; (B1) is much less restrictive than the generalized single crossing condition proposed by McAfee and McMillan [22] , since the iso-price curves in the latter context become hyperplanes, effectively reducing the problem to a single dimension. Hypothesis (B2) turns out to be necessary (but not sufficient) for the convexity of the principal's optimization problem and strategy space. 2 We also assume (B3) (non-negative cross-curvature)
whenever either of the two curves
If the inequality (2.1) becomes strict whenever x (0) and y (0) are non-vanishing, we say the valuation function b is positively cross-curved, and denote this by (B3) u . 3 2 Necessity of the convexity of Y x 0 for that of V b Y in Theorem 3.2 was pointed out to us by Brendan Pass in his response to this manuscript. In the context of Spence-Mirrlees and Rochet-Choné type valuations (Examples 3.3-3.4 below), the convexity of Y x 0 permits the space Y of product types to be interpreted as representing randomized (mixed) strategies. 3 We will eventually see that condition (B3) can alternately be characterized as in Lemma 4.3 using Definition 4.1; the convexity asserted by that lemma may appear more intuitive and natural than (B3) from point of view of applications. Historically, non-negative cross-curvature arose as a strengthening of Trudinger and Wang's criterion (A3w) guaranteeing smoothness of optimal maps in the Monge-Kantorovich transportation problem [37] ; unlike us, they require (2.1) only if, in addition,
Necessity of Trudinger and Wang's condition for continuity was shown by Loeper [19] , who (like Trudinger, and independently Kim and McCann [16] ) also noted its covariance and some of its relations to the geometric notion of curvature. Their condition relaxes a hypothesis proposed with Ma [21] , which required strict positivity of (2.1) when (2.2) holds. The strengthening considered here was first studied in a different but equivalent form by Kim and McCann, where both the original and the modified conditions were shown to correspond to pseudo-Riemannian sectional curvature conditions induced by buyer valuations on X × Y , thus highlighting their invariance under reparametrization of either X or Y by diffeomorphism; see Lemma 4.5 of [16] . The same lemma shows it costs no generality to require both curves
Results concerning the principal-agent problem
A mathematical concept of central relevance to us is encoded in the following definition. 
Although some authors permit b-convex functions to take the value +∞, our hypothesis (B0) ensures b-convex functions are Lipschitz continuous and thus that the suprema defining their b-transforms are finitely attained. Our first result is the following. To understand the relevance of this theorem to economic theory, let us recall a mathematical formulation of the principal-agent problem based on [8] and [29, 30] . In this context, each product y ∈ Y costs the principal c(y) to manufacture, and she is free to market this product to the population X of agents at any lower semicontinuous price v(y) that she chooses. She is aware that product y has value b(x, y) to agent x ∈ X, and that in response to any price menu v(y) she proposes, each agent will compute his indirect utility by combining his valuation for product y with its price quasi-linearly 2) and will choose to buy a product y b,v (x) which attains the maximum, meaning u(
). However, let us assume that there is a distinguished point y ∅ ∈ Y representing the null product (or outside option), which the principal is compelled to offer to all agents at zero profit,
3) either because both quantities vanish (representing the null transaction), or because, as in [6] , there is a competing supplier or regulator from whom the agents can obtain this product at price c(y ∅ ). In other words, u ∅ (x) := b(x, y ∅ ) − c(y ∅ ) acts as the reservation utility of agent x ∈ X, below which he will reject the principal's offers and decline to participate, whence u u ∅ . The map y b,v : X −→ Y from agents to products they select will not be continuous except possibly if the price menu v is b * -convex; when y b,v (x) depends continuously on x ∈ X we say v is strictly b * -convex.
Knowing b, c and a (Borel) probability measure μ on X -representing the relative frequency of different types of agents in the population -the principal's problem is to decide which lower semicontinuous price menu v : Y −→ R ∪ {+∞} maximizes her profits, or equivalently, minimizes her net losses:
Note the integrand vanishes (3.3)-(3.4) for any agent x who elects not to participate (i.e., who chooses the outside option y ∅ ∈ Y ). For absolutely continuous distributions of agents -or more generally if μ vanishes on Lipschitz hypersurfaces -it is known that the principal's losses (3.4) depend on v only through the indirect utility u = v b , an observation which can be traced back to Mirrlees [24] in one dimension and Rochet [29] more generally; see also Carlier [8] . This indirect utility u u ∅ is b-convex, due to the well-known identity show her minimization problem (3.4) becomes a convex functional of u on U 0 , so the principal's problem reduces to a convex program. Necessary and sufficient conditions for a minimum can in principle then be expressed using Kuhn-Tucker type conditions, and numerical examples could be solved using standard algorithms. However we do not do this here: unless μ is taken to be a finite combination of Dirac masses, the infinite dimensionality of the convex set V b Y leads to functional analytic subtleties even for the bilinear valuation function b(x, y) = x, y , which have only been resolved with partial success by Rochet and Choné in that case [31] . If the b * -convexity of c(y) is strict however, or if the valuation function is positively cross-curved (B3) u , we shall show the principal's program has enough strict convexity to yield unique optimal strategies for both the principal and the agents in a sense made precise by Theorem 4.6. These optimal strategies represent a Stackelberg (rather than a Nash) equilibrium, in the sense that no party has any incentive to change his or her strategies, given that the principal must commit to and declare her strategy before the agents select theirs.
Of course, it is of practical interest that the principal be able to anticipate not only her optimal price menu v : Y −→ R ∪ {+∞} -also known as the equilibrium prices -but the corresponding distribution of goods which she will be called on to manufacture. This can be represented as a Borel probability measure ν on Y , which we call the optimal production measure. It quantifies the relative frequency of goods to be produced, and is the image of μ under the agents' best response function y b,v : X −→ Y to the principal's optimal strategy v. This image ν = (y b,v ) # μ is a Borel probability measure on Y known as the push-forward of μ by y b,v , and is defined by the formula
for each W ⊂ Y . Theorem 4.6 asserts the optimal production measure ν is unique and the optimal price menu v is uniquely determined ν-a.e.; the same theorem gives a sharp lower bound for v throughout Y . If the convex domain X y ∅ is strictly convex and the density of agents is Lipschitz continuous on X, Theorem 4.8 goes on to assert that these prices will be high enough to drive a positive fraction of agents out of the market, extending Armstrong's desirability of exclusion [2] to a rich class of multidimensional models. Thus the goods to be manufactured and their prices are uniquely determined at equilibrium, and the principal can price the goods she prefers not to trade arbitrarily high but not arbitrarily low. Theorem 4.6 goes on to assert that the optimal strategy y b,v (x) is also uniquely determined for μ-almost every agent x by b, c and μ, for each Borel probability measure μ on X. Apart from Theorem 4.8, these conclusions apply to singular and discrete measures as well as to continuous measures μ, assuming the tie-breaking conventions of Remark 4.2 are adopted whenever μ fails to vanish on each Lipschitz hypersurface.
A number of examples of valuation functions b(x, y) which satisfy our hypotheses are developed in the works by Delanoë, Ge, Figalli, Kim, Lee, Li, Loeper, Ma, McCann, Rifford, Trudinger and Wang; see [17] and [38] for references. Here we mention a few which have relevance to economics: Y at each point where u is differentiable. Thus Theorem 4.6 asserts that any strictly convex manufacturing cost c(y) leads to unique optimal strategies for the principal and for μ-almost every agent. This uniqueness is well known for absolutely continuous measures dμ d vol [31] , and Carlier and Lachand-Robert have extended Mussa and Rosen's differentiability result u ∈ C 1 (X) to n 1 in that case [9, 26] , but the uniqueness of optimal strategies under the tiebreaking rules described in Remark 4.2 may be new results when applied, for example, to discrete distributions μ concentrated on finitely many agent types.
Example 3.5. Ma, Trudinger and Wang's perturbation b(x, y) = x · y + F (x)G(y) of the bilinear valuation function is non-negatively cross-curved (B3) provided F ∈ C 4 (X) and G ∈ C 4 (Y ) are both convex [21, 16] ; it is positively cross-curved if the convexity is strong, meaning both F (x) − |x| 2 and G(y) − |y| 2 remain convex for some > 0. It satisfies (B0)-(B1) provided sup x∈X |DF (x)| < 1 and sup y∈Y |DG(y)| < 1, and (B2) if the convex domains X and Y ⊂ R n are sufficiently convex, meaning all principal curvatures of these domains are sufficiently large at each boundary point [21] . On the other hand, 2 , modeling a family of buyers X ⊂ R n each of whom prefers to choose products corresponding as closely as possible to their own type. Such a function might model a geographical distribution of otherwise identical consumers who must decide whether to pay a high fee to have a certain service (such as deliveries or waste removal) provided directly to their home, an intermediate fee to obtain this service at a nearby depot, or no fee to obtain the service from a more remote source y ∅ = 0 (such as a centralized warehouse in the first case or a public landfill in the second). If the monopolist's costs for providing this service are independent of location c(y) = const, then the problem becomes mathematically equivalent to Rochet and Choné's (Example 3.4 above): each b-convex strategy u satisfies D 2 u −I , and corresponds to the convex strategy u(x) + |x| 2 /2 of [31] . From their results concerning product and buyer types in the unit disc or unit square X, we infer that only buyers sufficiently far from the source y ∅ can be induced to pay a positive price for the convenience of obtaining this service nearby. In the case of the square, there will be a strip of buyer types who select delivery points concentrated along the diagonal, followed by a region of buyers who pay more for individually customized delivery points. Since the products consumed lie in a subset of the square, the constraints Du ∈ [0, ∞[ 2 of [31] are not binding, allowing us to take
Example 3.6 (On geometry in spatial economics). Consider now a valuation function such as
This in turn allows us to reflect their solution in both the horizontal and vertical axes, to yield an example in which the outside option y ∅ lies in the center of a two-by-two square, rather than the corner of a one-byone square. Comparison with the case of the unit disc X centered at y ∅ , for which the solution is rotationally symmetric, shows the bunching observed by Rochet and Choné depends dramatically on the domain's geometry, and its lack of strict convexity. Now consider instead the possibility that the geographical region X, instead of being flat, is situated either at the bottom of a valley, or at a pass in the mountains, and that the valuation function b(x, y) = − 1 2 d(x, y) 2 reflects this geography, by depending on the distance d as measured along a spherical cap in the case of the valley or along a piece of a saddle in the case of the mountain pass. Then (B0)-(B1) are both satisfied, and (B2) will be too provided the domain X = Y is convex enough... consisting for example of all points sufficiently close to the free source y ∅ in the spherical or saddle geometry. According to results of Loeper [19, 20] and Kim and McCann [17] , (B3) will be satisfied in the case of the sphere [17] , but violated in the case of a saddle [19] . Thus for a town in a valley (or on a mountain top), our results show that the screening problem remains convex, while for a town located on a pass in the mountains the problem becomes non-convex. This calls into question the uniqueness, stability, and structure of its solution(s) in the latter case, and displays how geometry and geography can affect the solubility of economic problems.
In the next section we formulate the results mathematically. Let us first highlight a further implication of our results concerning robustness of the phenomena observed by Rochet and Choné. The quadratic functions b(x, y) = x · y and b(x, y) = − 1 2 |x − y| 2 both lie on the boundary of the set of non-negatively cross-curved valuations, since their cross-curvatures (2.1) vanish identically. Our results show non-negative cross-curvature (B3) to be a necessary and sufficient condition for the principal-agent problem to be a convex program: the feasible set V b Y becomes non-convex otherwise, and it is reasonable to expect that uniqueness of the solution among other phenomena observed in [31] may be violated in that case. In analogy with the discontinuities discovered by Loeper [19] , we therefore conjecture that the bundling discovered by Rochet and Choné is robust with respect to perturbations of the quadratic valuation functions which respect (B0)-(B3), but not generally with respect to perturbations violating (B3). (See [3] however, for a different robustness result.)
Mathematical formulation
for all (y, x) ∈ Y × X, according to definition (3.1). Comparison with (3.2) makes it clear that a (product, agent) pair produces equality in (4.1) if and only if selecting product y is among the best responses of agent x to this menu; the set of such best-response pairs is denoted by
We think of this relation as giving a multivalued correspondence between products and agents: given price menu v the set of agents (if any) willing to select product y is denoted by ∂ b * v(y). It turns out ∂ b * v(y) is non-empty for all y ∈ Y if and only if v is b * -convex. Thus b * -convexity of v -or of c -means precisely that each product is priced low enough to be included among the best responses of some agent or limiting agent type x ∈ X. As we shall see in Remark 4.2, assuming b * -convexity of v costs little or no generality; however, the b * -convexity of c is a real restriction -but plausible when the product types Y ⊂ R n represent mixtures (weighted combinations of pure products) which the principal could alternately choose to purchase separately and then bundle together; this becomes natural in the context of the bilinear valuation b(x, y) = x · y assumed by Rochet and Choné [31] . Let Dom Du ⊂ X denote the set where u is differentiable. If y is among the best responses of agent x ∈ Dom Dv b to price menu v, the equality in (4.1) implies
In other words y = y b (x, Dv b (x)), where y b is defined as follows:
Definition 4.1. For each q ∈ Y x , define y b (x, q) to be the unique product selected by an agent x ∈ X whose marginal utility with respect to his type is q; i.e. y b is the unique solution to
guaranteed by (B1). The map y b (which is defined on a subset of the cotangent bundle T * X and takes values in Y ) has also been called the b-exponential map [19] , and denoted by
The fact that the best response function takes the form y = y b (x, Dv b (x)), and that Dom Dv b exhausts X except for a countable number of Lipschitz hypersurfaces, are key observations exploited throughout both the economic and optimal transportation literature. Indeed, v b is well known to be a b-convex function. It is therefore Lipschitz and semiconvex, satisfying the bounds
The second inequality above holds in the distributional sense, and implies the differentiability of v b outside a countable number of Lipschitz hypersurfaces [14] . Assuming μ assigns zero mass to each Lipschitz hypersurface (and so also to a countable number of them), the results just summarized allow the principal's problem (3.4) to be reexpressed in the form min{L(u) | u ∈ U 0 }, where the principal's net losses are given by
as is by now well known [8] .
, and the equality produced in (4.1) by the response
e. x has been exploited. Our hypothesis on the distribution of agent types holds a fortiori whenever μ is absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure on X. If no such hypothesis is satisfied, the reformulation (4.5) of the principal's net losses may not be well defined, unless we extend the definition of Du(x) to all of X by making a measurable selection from the relation
consistent with the following tie-breaking rule, analogous to one adopted, e.g., by Buttazzo and Carlier in a similar context [6] :
Remark 4.2 (Tie-breaking rules for singular measures).
When an agent x remains indifferent between two or more products, it is convenient to reduce the ambiguity in the definition of his best response by insisting that y b,v (x) be chosen to maximize the principal's profit v(y) − c(y), among those products y which maximize (3.2). We retain the result
. This convention costs no generality when the distribution μ of agent types vanishes on Lipschitz hypersurfaces in X, since u = v b is then differentiable μ-a.e.; in the remaining cases it may be justified by assuming the principal has sufficient powers of persuasion to sway an agent's choice to her own advantage whenever some indifference would otherwise persist between his preferred products [24] . After adopting this convention, it costs the principal none of her profits to restrict her choice of strategies to b * -convex price menus v = (v b ) b * , a second convention we also choose to adopt whenever μ fails to vanish on each Lipschitz hypersurface.
The relevance of Theorem 3.2 to the principal-agent problem should now be clear: it guarantees convexity of the feasible set U 0 in (4.5). Our next proposition addresses the convexity properties of the principal's objective functional (i.e. her net losses). Should convexity of this objective be strict, then the best response y b,v (x) selected by the tie-breaking rule above becomes unique -which it need not be otherwise.
We precede this proposition with a lemma containing a more intuitive characterization of nonnegative cross-curvature found by two of us [17] . After (B2) and the second part of hypothesis (B1) are used to define y b (x, q), notice the first part of (B1) becomes equivalent to the absence of critical points for the functions (4.6) of q. Inspired by Loeper's characterization [19] of (A3w), the next lemma asserts (B3) is equivalent to convexity of these non-critical functions.
Lemma 4.3 (Characterizing non-negative cross-curvature [17]). A valuation b satisfying (B0)-(B2) is non-negatively cross-curved (B3) if and only if for each
is a convex function. If the valuation is positively cross-curved, then (4.6) will be strongly convex (meaning its Hessian will be positive definite).
This lemma plays a key role in establishing the proposition which follows. 
is a strictly convex function of q for all x 0 ∈ X \ {x}.
The strict convexity of (4.7) may subsequently be denoted by (B3) s , a condition which Lemma 4.3 shows to be intermediate in strength between non-negative cross-curvature (B3) and positive cross-curvature (B3) u . As an immediate corollary to Theorem 3.2 and Proposition 4.4, we have convexity of the principal's optimization problem. As a consequence, we obtain criteria guaranteeing uniqueness of the principal's best strategy. This theorem gives hypotheses which guarantee -even for discrete measures μ corresponding to finitely many agent types -that the solution to the principal's problem is unique in the sense that optimality determines how many of each type of product the principal should manufacture, what price she should charge for each of them, and which product will be selected by almost every agent. A lower bound is specified on the price of each product which she does not wish to produce, to ensure that it does not tempt any agent. When μ vanishes on Lipschitz hypersurfaces, this solution represents the only Stackelberg equilibrium balancing the interests of the principal with those of the agents; for more singular μ, it is possible that other Stackelberg equilibria exist, but if so they violate the restrictions imposed on the behaviour of the principal and the agents in Remark 4.2.
The uniqueness theorem has as its corollary the following stability result concerning optimal strategies. Recall that a sequence {μ i } ∞ i=1 of Borel probability measures on a compact set X ⊂ R n is said to converge weakly-
for each continuous test function g : X −→ R. This notion of convergence makes the Borel probability measures P (X) on X into a compact set, as a consequence of the Riesz-Markov and Banach-Alaoglu theorems. 
Finally as evidence for the robustness of bunching phenomena displayed by our models, we show the desirability of exclusion phenomenon found by Armstrong for valuations b(x, y) = n i=1 x i b i (y) which are linear -or more generally homogeneous of degree one -in x [2] , extends to the full range of non-negatively cross-curved models. We assume strict convexity on the domain X y ∅ := D y b(X, y ∅ ) (see Remark 4.9), and that the distribution of agent types dμ(x) = f (x)dx has a Sobolev density -denoted f ∈ W 1,1 (X) and meaning both the function and its distributional derivative Df are given by Lebesgue integrable densities. This is satisfied a fortiori if f is Lipschitz or continuously differentiable (as Armstrong assumed). The exclusion phenomenon is of interest, since it confirms that a positive fraction of customers must be excluded from participation at equilibrium, thus ensuring elasticity of demand. 
Theorem 4.8 (The desirability of exclusion). Let the distribution dμ(x) = f (x)dx of agent types be given by a density

Remark 4.9 (Facets and exclusion in different dimensions).
A convex domain X ⊂ R n fails to be strictly convex if it has line segments in its boundary. These segments belong to facets of dimension 1 or higher, up to n − 1 if the domain has a flat side (meaning a positive fraction of its boundary coincides with a supporting hyperplane). Thus strict convexity of X y ∅ is sufficient for the hypothesis of the preceding theorem to be satisfied -except in dimension n = 1. In a single dimension, every convex domain X ⊂ R is an interval -hence strictly convex -whose endpoints form zero-dimensional facets. Thus Theorem 4.8 is vacuous in dimension n = 1, which is consistent with Armstrong's observation the necessity of exclusion is a hallmark of higher dimensions n 2. More recently, Deneckere and Severinov [10] have argued that necessity of exclusion is specific to the case in which the dimensions m and n of agent and product types coincide. When (m, n) = (2, 1) they give necessary and sufficient conditions for the desirability of exclusion, yielding a result quite different from ours in that exclusion turns out to be more frequently the exception than the rule. However, for another setting in which exclusion is generic, see [3] .
Discussion, extension, and conclusions
The role of private information in determining market value has a privileged place in economic theory. This phenomenon has been deeply explored in the principal-agent framework, where a single seller (or single buyer) transacts business with a collection of anonymous agents. In this context, the private (asymmetric) information takes the form of a characteristic x ∈ X peculiar to each individual buyer which determines his valuation b(x, y) for different products y ∈ Y offered by the principal; x remains concealed from the principal by anonymity of the buyer -at least until a purchase is made. Knowing only the valuation function b(x, y), the statistical distribution dμ(x) of buyer types, and her own manufacturing costs c(y), the principal's goal is to fix a price menu for different products which maximizes her profits.
Many studies involving finite spaces of agent and product types X and Y have been carried out, including Spence's initial work on labour market signalling. However for a principal who transacts business with a one-dimensional continuum of agents X ⊂ R, the problem was solved in Mirrlees' celebrated work on optimal taxation [24] , and in Spence's study [35] , assuming the contract types y ∈ Y ⊂ R are also parameterized by a single real variable. (For Mirrlees, y ∈ R represented the amount of labour an individual chooses to do facing a given tax schedule, while for Spence it represented the amount of education he chooses to acquire facing a given range of employment possibilities, x ∈ R being his intrinsic ability in both cases.) In the context of nonlinear pricing discussed above, the one-dimensional model was studied by Mussa and Rosen [26] . The challenge of resolving the multidimensional version X, Y ⊂ R n of this archetypal problem in microeconomic theory has been highlighted by many authors [27, 22, 32, 5] . When only one side of the market displays multidimensional types, analyses have been carried out by Mirman and Sibley [23] , Roberts [28] and Spence [36] , who allow multidimensional products, and by Laffont, Maskin and Rochet [18] , and Deneckere and Severinov [10] who model two-dimensional agents choosing from a one-dimensional product line. When both sides of the market display multidimensional types, existence of an equilibrium has been established by Monteiro and Page [25] and by Carlier [8] , who employed a variational formulation; see also the control-theoretic approach of Basov [5] . However, non-convexities have rendered the behaviour of this optimization problem largely intractable [15] -unless the valuation function b(x, y) = x · G(y) is assumed to depend linearly on agent type [39, 2, 31] . Moreover, the presence of convexity typically depends on a correct choice of coordinates, so is not always easy to discern. The present study treats general Borel probability measures μ on X ⊂ R n , and provides a unified framework for dealing with discrete and continuous type spaces, by invoking the tie-breaking rules of Remark 4.2 in case μ is discrete. Assuming b * -convexity of c, we consider valuations linear in price (3.2) (sometimes called quasilinear), which satisfy a generalized Spence-Mirrlees single crossing condition (B0)-(B1) and appropriate convexity conditions on its domain (B2), and we identify a criterion (B3) equivalent to convexity of the principal's optimization problem (Theorem 3.2). This criterion is a strengthening of Ma, Trudinger and Wang's necessary [19] and sufficient [21, 37] condition for continuity of optimal mappings. Like all of our hypotheses, it is independent of the choice of parameterization of agent and/or product types -as emphasized in [16] . We believe the resulting convexity is a fundamental property which will eventually enable a more complete theoretical and computational analysis of the multidimensional principal-agent problem, and we indicate some examples of valuation functions which satisfy it in Examples 3.3-3.6; the bilinear example b(x, y) = x · y of Rochet and Choné lies on the boundary of such valuation functions. If either the cross-curvature inequality (B3) holds strictly or the b * -convexity of c(y) is strict -meaning the efficient solution y b,c (x) depends continuously on x ∈ X -we go on to derive uniqueness and stability of optimal strategies (Theorem 4.6 and its corollary). Under mild additional hypotheses we confirm that a positive fraction of agents must be priced out of the market when the type spaces are multidimensional (Theorem 4.8). We conjecture that non-negative crosscurvature (B3) is likely to be necessary and sufficient for robustness of Armstrong's desirability of exclusion [2] and the other bunching phenomena observed by Rochet and Choné [31] .
Remark 5.1 (Maximizing social welfare under profitability constraints).
Before concluding this paper, let us briefly mention an important class of related models to which the same considerations apply: namely, the problem of maximizing the expected welfare of the agents under a profitability constraint on the principal. Such a model has been used by Roberts [28] to study energy pricing by a public utility, and explored by Spence [36] and Monteiro and Page [25] in other contexts. Suppose the welfare of agent x ∈ X is given by a function w(x, u(x)) of his indirect utility (3.2) which is concave with respect to its second variable: ∂ 2 w/∂u 2 0. Introducing a Lagrange multiplier λ for the profitability constraint L(u) 0, the problem of maximizing the net social welfare over all agents becomes equivalent to the maximization
for some choice of λ 0. Assuming (B0)-(B3), and b * -convexity of c, for each λ 0 this amounts to a concave maximization on a convex set, as a consequence of Theorem 3.2, Proposition 4.4 and the concavity of w. Theorem 4.6 and its corollary give hypotheses which guarantee uniqueness and stability of its solution u λ ; if the concavity of w(x, ·) is strict, we obtain uniqueness μ-a.e. of u λ more directly under the weaker hypotheses of Corollary 4.5. Either way, once the uniqueness of u λ has been established, standard arguments in the calculus of variations show the convex function W (λ) to be continuously differentiable, and that each value of its derivative W (λ) = −L(u λ ) corresponds to a possibly degenerate interval λ ∈ [λ 1 , λ 2 ] on which u λ is constant; see e.g. Corollary 2.11 of [7] . Uniqueness of a social welfare maximizing strategy subject to any budget constraint in the range ]L(u 0 ), L(u ∞ )[ is therefore established; this range contains the vanishing budget constraint as long as L(u 0 ) > 0 > L(u ∞ ); here u 0 represents the unconstrained maximizer whereas u ∞ ∈ U 0 minimizes the principal's losses (4.5). All of our resultsexcept for the desirability of exclusion (Theorem 4.8) -extend immediately to this new setting. This sole exception is in accord with the intuition that it need not be necessary to exclude any potential buyers if one aims to maximize social welfare instead of the monopolist's profits.
Proofs
The first sentence of Lemma 4.3 comes from Theorem 2.11 of [17] . We recall its proof partly for the sake of completeness, but also to establish the second sentence, which asserts strong convexity. Conversely, if the convexity of (4.6) fails we can find x 1 ∈ X and s 0 , t 0 ∈ [0, 1] for which the construction above yields g (s 0 ) < 0. In view of Lemma 4.5 of [16] , this provides a contradiction to (2.1). 2
We shall also need to recall two basic facts about b-convex functions from e.g. [14] : any supremum of b-convex functions is again b-convex, unless it is identically infinite; and for each y ∈ Y and λ ∈ R, the function is a supremum of mountains, whence
for all x ∈ X and q ∈ Y x . According to Lemma 4.3, we have just expressed a(q) as a supremum of convex functions, thus establishing convexity of a(q). The remainder of the proof will be devoted to deducing strict convexity of a(q) under the additional hypotheses (i) or (ii). In case (ii), (B3) s implies all but one of the functions of q ∈ Y x under the supremum above are strictly convex, the exception being the constant function −c b (x) corresponding to x 0 = x. Thus a(q) is strictly convex, except possibly on the set {q ∈ Y x | a(q) = −c b (x)} where its lower bound is attained. However, if q 0 belongs to this set, differentiating the function under the supremum with respect to x 0 yields D x b(x, y b (x, q 0 )) ∈ ∂c b (x). Since (ii) assumes differentiability of c b at x, (B1) then implies the minimum of a(q) is attained uniquely at q 0 = Dc b (x), to establish strict convexity of a(q).
The remainder of the proof will be devoted to case (i): deducing strict convexity of a(q) from strict b * -convexity of c(y) assuming only (B3). Recall that strict b * -convexity was defined by continuity of the agents' responses y b,c : X −→ Y to the principal's manufacturing costs (as opposed to the prices the principal would prefer to select). Fix x ∈ X and use the C 3 change of
As in [13] , it is easy to deduce thatb satisfies the same hypotheses (B0)-(B3) on X × Y x as the original valuation function -except for the fact that b ∈ C 3 whereas b ∈ C 4 . For the reasons explained in [13] this discrepancy shall not trouble us here: we still have continuous fourth derivatives ofb as long as at least one of the four derivatives is with respect to a variable in X, and at most three derivatives are with respect to variables in Y x . Note also thatcb = c b and the continuity of the agents' responses yb ,c in the new variables follows from their presumed continuity in the original variables, since yb ,c (·) = D x c(x, y b,c (·) ).
The advantage of the new variables is that for each x 0 ∈ X, the mountain q ∈ Y x −→b(x 0 , q) is a convex function, according to Lemma 4.3; (alternately, Theorem 4.3 of [13] ). To produce a contradiction, assume convexity ofc(q) fails to be strict, so there is a segment t ∈ [0, 1] −→ q t ∈ Y x given by q t = (1 − t)q 0 + tq 1 along whichc is affine with the same slope p ∈ ∂c(q t ) for each t ∈ [0, 1]. In fact, the compact convex set ∂c(q t ) is independent of t ∈]0, 1[, so taking p to be an extreme point of ∂c(q t ) allows us to find a sequence q t,k ∈ Y x ∩ Dom Dc converging to q t such that p = lim k→∞ Dc(q t,k ), by Theorem 25.6 of Rockafellar [33] . On the other hand, b * -convexity impliesc(q) is a supremum of mountains: thus to each t ∈ [0, 1] and integer k corresponds some x t,k ∈ X such that (x t,k , q t,k ) ∈ ∂b * c , meaning
Compactness of X allows us to extract a subsequential limit (x t,k , q t,k ) → (x t , q t ) ∈ ∂b * c satisfying p = D qb (x t , q t ). This first order condition shows the curve t ∈ [0, 1] −→ x t ∈ X to be differentiable, with derivativė
by the implicit function theorem and (B1). On the other hand, bothc(·) andb(x t , ·) are convex functions of q ∈ Y x in (6.3), so both must be affine along the segment q t . This impliesq t = q 1 − q 0 is a zero eigenvector of D 2 qqb (x t , q t ), which in turn implies x t = const from (6.4). On the other hand, the efficient response q t = yb ,c (x t ) of agent x t to price menuc is not constant, since the endpoints q 0 = q 1 of the segment are distinct. This produces the desired contradiction and establishes strict convexity ofc. 2 Combining Proposition 4.4 with the following standard lemma will allow us to establish our necessary and sufficient criteria for convexity of the feasible set U 0 . Du 1 holds μ-a.e. This establishes the uniqueness μ-a.e. of the agents' equilibrium strategies y b,v (x) := y b (x, Du 1 (x) ), and of the principal's optimal measure ν := (y b,v ) # μ in (3.5).
Lemma 6.1 (Identification of supporting mountains). Let u be a b-convex function on
Let spt μ denote the smallest closed subset of X containing the full mass of μ. To identify u 0 = u 1 on spt μ and establish the remaining assertions is more technical. First observe that the participation constraint
on the continuous function u 1/2 ∈ U 0 must bind for some agent type x 0 ∈ spt μ; otherwise, for > 0 sufficiently small, u 1/2 − would belong to U 0 and reduce the principal's losses by , contradicting the asserted optimality of u 1/2 . Since u 1/2 is a convex combination of two other functions obeying the same constraint, we conclude u 0 (x 0 ) = u 1 (x 0 ) coincides with the reservation utility u ∅ (x 0 ) for type x 0 . Now use the map y b,v := y b • Du 1 from the first paragraph of the proof to define a joint measure for μ almost all x, whence u − must be an optimal strategy: it is smaller in value than u i and produces at least as favorable a response as u i from almost all agents. Finally since
the fact that u i minimizes the losses of the principal implies the continuous integrand vanishes μ-almost everywhere. Thus u i u − on X, with equality holding throughout spt μ as desired.
Since u 0 was arbitrary, we have now proved that all optimal u ∈ U 0 coincide with u 1 on spt μ. Optimality of u also implies spt γ ⊂ ∂ b u; if in addition the participation constraint u(x) b(x, y ∅ ) − c(y ∅ ) binds at x 0 , then u u − on X. Although u − appears to depend on our choice of x 0 ∈ spt μ in the construction above this is not actually the case: u(x 0 ) = u 1 (x 0 ) shows the participation constraint binds at x 0 for every optimal strategy and u − is therefore uniquely determined by its minimality among optimal strategies u ∈ U 0 . Now, since any supremum of b-convex functions (not identically infinite) is again b-convex, define u + ∈ U 0 as the pointwise supremum among all of the principal's equilibrium strategies u ∈ U 0 . The foregoing shows u + = u − on spt μ, while (x, y) ∈ spt γ ⊂ ∂ b u implies To show stability of the equilibrium requires the following convergence result concerning Borel probability measures P (X × Y ) on the product space. 
Notice γ i is supported in ∂ b i u i and has μ i for its left marginal, hence converges weakly- * to γ ∞ . Moreover, our choice of measurable selection guarantees that the net losses (4.5) of the principal choosing strategy u i coincide with
Weak- * convergence of the measures γ i γ ∞ couples with uniform convergence of the integrands to yield the desired limit
and establish the proposition. 0 , the uniqueness of equilibrium product selected by μ ∞ -a.e. agent x ∈ X in Theorem 4.6 will then imply that lim j →∞ G i(j ) (x) = G ∞ (x) converges to a limit independent of the subsequence chosen, hence the full sequence
To see thatū minimizes (6.5) . The left marginal of γ i is obviously given by μ i , and its right marginal coincides with the unique optimal measure ν i given by Theorem 4.6. Proposition 6.2 then yields weak- * convergence of γ i γ ∞ and hence of ν i ν ∞ . Theorem 4.6 also asserts the two minimizers u ∞ =ū agree μ ∞ -a.e. In this case the uniform limitū is independent of the Ascoli-Arzelà subsequence, hence we recover convergence of the full sequence
Finally, let us extend Armstrong's desirability of exclusion to our model. Our proof is inspired by Armstrong's [2] , but differs from his in a number of ways.
Proof of Theorem 4.8. Use the C 3 -smooth diffeomorphism x ∈ X −→ p = D y b(x, y ∅ ) ∈ X y ∅ provided by (B0)-(B2) and its inverse p ∈ X y ∅ −→ x = x b (y ∅ , p) ∈ X to reparameterize the space of agents over the strictly convex set
In other words, the space U 0 corresponds to the spaceŨ 0 of nonnegativeb-convex functions on X y ∅ in the new parameterization. This subtraction of the reservation utility from the valuation function does not change any agent's response to a price menu v offered by the principal, since valuations by different agent types are never compared. However, it does make the valuation functionb(p, y) a convex function of p ∈ X y ∅ , as is easily seen by interchanging the roles of x and y in Lemma 4.3. The indirect utilityũ(p) = vb(p) is then also convex, being a supremum (3.1) of such valuation functions.
In the new variables, the distribution of agentsf (p)dp }. Observe thatŨ 0 must be non-empty, since otherwise for > 0 small enoughŨ would be empty, and thenũ − ∈Ũ 0 is a better strategy, reducing the principal's losses by . We now claim the interior of the setŨ 0 -which corresponds to agents who decline to participate -contains a non-zero fraction of the total population of agents. Our argument is inspired by the strategy Armstrong worked out in a special case [2] , which was to show that unless this conclusion is true, the profit the principal extracts from agents inŨ would vanish at a higher order than > 0, makingũ := max{ũ − , 0} ∈Ũ 0 a better strategy thanũ for the principal when is sufficiently small. wheren =nŨ (p) denotes the outer until normal toŨ at p, and the divergence theorem has been used. Here ∂Ũ denotes the boundary of the convex setŨ , and dS(p) denotes the n − 1 dimensional surface (i.e. Hausdorff) measure on this boundary. (For Sobolev functions, the integration by parts formula that we need is contained in §4.3 of [12] under the additional restriction that the vector fieldũ(·)D q a(0,ũ(·), ·) be C 1 smooth, but extends immediately to Lipschitz vectors fields by approximation; the operation of restrictingf to the boundary ofŨ is there shown to give a bounded linear map from W 1,1 (U , dp) to L 1 (∂U , dS) called the boundary trace.) As → 0, we claim both integrals in (6.7) vanish at rate o( ) if the interior ofŨ 0 is empty. To see this, noteũ = on ∂Ũ ∩ int X y ∅ , so Notice that domain monotonicity implies the → 0 limit of the last expressions above is given by integrals over the limiting domainŨ 0 = ∩ >0Ũ . Assume now the interior of the convex set U 0 is empty, so thatŨ 0 has dimension at most n − 1. Then the volume |Ũ | = o (1) , hence the first integral in the right-hand side dwindles to zero as → 0, (recalling thatũ is Lipschitz,f ∈ W 1,1 andã ∈ C 3 ). Concerning the second term, if the convex setŨ 0 has dimension n − 1 then its relative interior must be disjoint from the boundary of the convex body X y ∅ , since the latter is assumed to have no n − 1 dimensional facets. Either wayŨ 0 ∩ ∂X y ∅ has dimension at most n − 2, which, together with the fact that the boundary trace off is integrable, implies that
as → 0. All in all, we have shown L (ũ) = o( ) as → 0 wheneverŨ 0 has empty interior, which -as was explained above -contradicts the asserted optimality of the strategyũ. However, even ifŨ 0 has non-empty interior, more must be true to avoid inferring the contradictory conclusion L (ũ) = o( ) as → 0 from (6.8): one of the two limiting integrals Ũ 0 ∇ p · f (p)D qã 0,ũ(p), p dp > 0 or
must be non-vanishing. In either case, the W 1,1 densityf must be positive somewhere inŨ 0 , whose interior therefore includes a positive fraction of the agents. Sinceũ is differentiable with vanishing gradient on the interior ofŨ 0 , there is no ambiguity in the strategy of these agents: they respond toũ by choosing the outside option. 2
Appendix A. Minimal b-convex potentials
The purpose of this appendix is to establish a mathematical result (and some terminology) needed in the last part of the uniqueness proof, Theorem 4.6. In particular, we establish a minimality property enjoyed by Rochet's construction of a b-convex function for which ∂ b u contains a prescribed set [30] ; Rochet's construction is modeled on the analogous construction by Rockafellar of a convex function u whose subdifferential ∂u contains a given cyclically monotone set [33] .
Recall a relation S ⊂ X × Y is b-cyclically monotone if for each integer k ∈ N and k-tuple of points ( x 1 , y 1 ) , . . . , (x k , y k ) ∈ S, the inequality andũ(x i ) < ∞, by evaluating (A.2) at x i and at x 0 . Summing the displayed inequalities from i = 0, . . . , k, arbitrariness of x k+1 ∈ X yields the desired result:ũ(x k+1 ) u(x k+1 ). 2
